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Abstract
A number of key distribution protocols using multiple authentication servers, where a
minority of them may be untrustworthy, have recently been proposed. This paper analyses
the problem of key distribution using minimally trusted multiple servers, and presents a
new protocol. In this protocol, as long as all servers do not collude to defraud the clients,
either a session key (not known to any server) is successfully established, or the protocol
fails in such a way that the clients are aware that it has failed, i.e. the protocol works in a
situation where the servers are `minimally trusted'.
1 Introduction
We suppose that two entities, which do not have appropriate security-related knowledge of
one another, want to communicate securely. For this purpose they get assistance from a third
party, referred to as an authentication server, which provides them (as clients) with a service
including the verication of one another's identity and the establishment of a shared session key.
Typically, it is assumed that the server is trustworthy for both clients, and an authentication and
key distribution protocol depends on this trust relationship for correctness. However, in some
environments where such a protocol is used, the clients have no reason to trust an individual
server, e.g. there may be corrupted servers or failed servers, which do not follow the protocol
specications correctly [6]. In such circumstances, the clients cannot rely on the servers to
adhere to the protocol rules.
Some recent research [2, 3, 6, 8, 9, 12] has focussed on analysing trust in authentication servers,
and constructing secure key distribution protocols which do not require trusting individual
authentication servers. A range of possible approaches have been considered.
In one approach, a client can choose which server is trustworthy from a set of authentication
servers, typically by applying a security policy or the history of performance and reliability.
Yahalom et al. [12] proposed a protocol which allows a client or his agent to choose trustworthy

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servers and avoid untrustworthy ones. One diculty with this scheme is that a client may
sometimes nd it dicult to distinguish between trustworthy and untrustworthy servers.
Another approach (see, for example, [4]), based on asymmetric cryptography, is to separate
authentication information transfer from authentication information issue, i.e. to let the au-
thentication information issuer be o-line. One instance of this approach is where a master
server (sometimes called the authentication information issuer or certication authority) issues
a certicate which is then held by another server (sometimes called the authentication informa-
tion transferrer). The certicate is valid for a period of time, during which there is no need to
further contact the master server, since the transferrer can provide the certicate. The client
does not need to trust the on-line transferrer, but does need to trust the issuer. This approach
does not reduce the need for a single completely trusted server, although this server may now
be o-line.
A third approach uses a set of servers simultaneously to achieve authentication. Gong [6]
proposed a protocol with multiple authentication servers such that a minority of corrupted and
colluding servers cannot compromise security or disrupt service. In that protocol two clients
participate in choosing a session key, and each relevant server is responsible for converting and
distributing a part of the session key. Two variations on this approach have been described in
[3], in both of which the servers each generate a part of a session key, which can be successfully
established between a pair of entities as long as more than half the servers are trustworthy.
However, in some environments, requiring a majority of the servers to be trustworthy is too
`strong' a condition.
In this paper we consider another variation on the third approach above. We start in Section 2
by discussing possible trust relationships between clients and servers during authentication and
key distribution, and in Section 3 we set up our notation and state our fundamental assumptions.
Following this discussion, in Sections 4 and 5 we present two variants of an authentication and
key distribution protocol using minimally trusted servers. The new protocol is loosely based on
a 3-party authentication and key distribution protocol recently proposed by Steiner et al. [11].
Steiner et al.'s protocol, using Die-Hellman key agreement [5], requires the third party to be
trustworthy, because a dishonest server can subvert the protocol by impersonating one client
to another. However, their protocol has the interesting feature that the resultant session key,
although contributed to and `strengthened' by the server, is not disclosed to him. In the new
protocol, clients do not need to trust either an individual server or a majority of the servers.
This symmetric cryptography and Die-Hellman key agreement based authentication protocol
works as long as not all of the servers are untrustworthy and colluding.
We then, in Section 6, briey consider other possible variants on the basic protocol. The nal
section contains our conclusions.
2 Trust relationships
Simmons and Meadows [10] pointed out that an information integrity protocol involves a transfer
of trust. For example, in a typical 3-party key distribution protocol, the two clients both share
secret keys with a server. Each client trusts that the server will protect its key, and authenticate
all client requests and responses. That means both clients believe the server will be honest and
competent to follow the protocol specications correctly. After the protocol succeeds, a session
key is established between these two clients. So trust in the server, and in the integrity of the
client's secure communication links with the server, has been transferred to trust in the integrity
of the communication link, established using the session key, between two clients who had no
prior trusted contact. If the server cannot be trusted then neither can the newly established
link between clients.
As was mentioned earlier, the two clients may not trust an individual server, and so they might
make use of a set of servers to complete identity verication and session key establishment.
We now observe what kinds of trust could be transferred. In general, there are four dierent
cases to consider, depending on how many servers are available and how many of them are
trustworthy.
1. Two clients trust a single authentication server. This is the `standard' case we have
mentioned above.
2. Two clients trust dierent authentication servers. An example is provided by a mobile
telecommunications system, where two communicating mobile users, who are registered
with dierent service providers
1
, only trust their own service providers. These two service
providers collaborate to provide an authentication service to the users.
3. Two clients trust that at least k authentication servers from a set of n such servers will
follow the protocol correctly. In this case, the clients do not trust any particular servers,
but they believe that at least k of the servers, which may be either a majority or a
minority, will follow the protocol specications correctly. One example of this case is
two mobile users with a set of network operators
2
in a global mobile telecommunications
system. These two users, who are roaming between dierent networks, get security-related
assistance from a set of network operators. Neither user trusts any individual network
operator, but they may have reason to believe that some of the network operators are
`good'.
4. Two clients only believe that a set of servers are not all colluding. In this case, the clients
do not trust any of the servers, but they believe that the servers cannot all collude to
defraud them. The example described in the last case still applies, where the mobile users
may have reason to believe that the network operators are not all colluding.
The type of trust relationship which may exist between clients and servers depends on the
environment in which the protocol is used. When there is no single server trusted by both clients,
the clients possibly need to ask two or more untrustworthy servers to provide an authentication
service. Such a set of servers, each of whom is of questionable trustworthiness when acting
alone, can be believed by the clients to be acceptably trustworthy, when they are compelled to
1
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In a mobile system, a network operator allows users to gain access to the network in order to be able to use
the services. A set of network operators may collaborate to provide an authentication service and distribute a
session key to two mobile users.
act jointly by an appropriate protocol. After the protocol succeeds, the trust in the joint action
of all the servers is transferred to a trust in the security of the communications established
using the session key between two clients.
Finally note that no protocol can work correctly if all the servers are untrustworthy and they
all collaborate, since they can jointly impersonate one client to another. Hence the minimal
possible trust requirement is encapsulated in Case 4 above.
3 Assumptions and notation
The protocols we describe are based on symmetric encipherment and Die-Hellman key agree-
ment. It is assumed that two clients A and B want to communicate securely with each other.
For this purpose they need to verify each other's identity and establish a shared session key,
but before the authentication processing starts they do not share any secret. They therefore
make use of third parties, namely a set of servers S
1
, ..., S
n
. We consider two possible trust
relationships, namely cases 3 and 4 discussed above.
We assume that the encipherment operation used provides origin authentication and integrity
services, i.e. a received message encrypted using a shared secret must have been sent by the
owner of the secret in the form that it was received. We suppose that the Die-Hellman key
agreement used is based on the Galois Field Z
p
(p prime), and g, a primitive element of Z

p
.
We also suppose that A and B have agreed use of p and g, which may be universally used
within some domain of clients, and that p and g are chosen so that the Die-Hellman problem
is insoluble, i.e. so that computing g
xy
from knowledge of g, p, g
x
, and g
y
(for any x; y 2Z

p
) is
computationally infeasible.
In the protocol descriptions, we make use of the following notation.
 fXg
K
is the result of the encipherment of dataX with a symmetric encipherment algorithm
using the key K.
 h is a collision-free, one-way hash function.
 D
Q
2 N is entity Q's private key agreement value and R
Q
(= g
D
Q
mod p) is Q's public key
agreement value. R
Q
and D
Q
are changed in every use of the protocol.
 X; Y is the result of the concatenation of data items X and Y .
 P ! Q : Z denotes that P sends message Z to Q.
 K
AB
(= h(g
D
A
D
B
mod p)) is the session key shared by A and B as a result of the protocol.
Finally observe that we abuse our notation slightly and use A and B to indicate both entities
and identiers for these entities. The exact meaning should be clear from the context.
4 The basic protocol
We rst describe a simple version of our protocol, which operates in the `minimal trust' case,
where no servers are trusted to behave correctly. We only assume that not all the servers will
collude together. This protocol thus applies to any of the trust relationships described above,
in particular it applies even in Case 4. We actually elaborate this trust case slightly. For the
purposes of this protocol suppose that A and B believe that no more than n k of the n servers
can collude to defraud them (the case k = 1 corresponds to the situation described in Case
4 above). In fact the protocol could be modied in a trivial way to allow A and B to choose
dierent values of k, but, for the sake of simplicity we assume they choose the same value.
However, as we will see, if a secret value used by one of the legitimate parties in any instance of
the protocol is compromised, then the protocol is vulnerable to attack. In a subsequent section
we describe a more elaborate protocol which oers of measure of protection against attacks
based on a compromise of `old secrets'.
4.1 Protocol description
The protocol has ve `rounds' of exchanged messages: M
1
;M
2i
;M
3i
;M
4
;M
5
, where messages
M
2i
and M
3i
are sent for every i (1  i  n). If, at any point in the protocol, A or B decide to
reject one of the servers S
i
, in all subsequent messages the information corresponding to S
i
is
replaced by an appropriate error message.
A initially chooses and stores D
A
secretly, calculates R
A
= g
D
A
mod p, enciphers n blocks made
up of R
A
and B using K
AS
i
(1  i  n), and sends these n blocks together with its own name
to B in M
1
.
M
1
: A! B : A; fR
A
; Bg
K
AS
1
; fR
A
; Bg
K
AS
2
; : : : ; fR
A
; Bg
K
AS
n
On receiving M
1
, B chooses and stores D
B
secretly, calculates R
B
= g
D
B
mod p, enciphers n
blocks made up of R
B
and A using K
BS
i
(1  i  n), and sends the ith enciphered block with
A's ith enciphered block and both clients' names to S
i
in M
2i
(1  i  n).
M
2i
: B ! S
i
: A;B; fR
A
; Bg
K
AS
i
; fR
B
; Ag
K
BS
i
On receipt of M
2i
, S
i
deciphers both parts, enciphers two blocks made up of R
A
, R
B
and A or
B using K
BS
i
or K
AS
i
respectively, and then sends them in M
3i
(1  i  n) to B.
M
3i
: S
i
! B : fR
A
; R
B
; Bg
K
AS
i
; fR
B
; R
A
; Ag
K
BS
i
After receivingM
3i
, B deciphers its second part using K
BS
i
, 1  i  n. B next checks whether
the decrypted half of each messageM
3i
contains both the correct value of R
B
and the expected
identier for A. If not, B rejects the server S
i
. Similarly, if no response is obtained from S
i
before some predened time-out, B will again reject this server. B now compares the values of
R
A
in the decrypted second half of all remaining messagesM
3i
(i.e. all those not so far rejected).
If at least n k+1 of the values agree on a value R
A
, then B provisionally accepts this value of
R
A
, and rejects any servers supplying a dierent value of R
A
. If there are two or more sets of
n  k+ 1 messages, each agreeing on a dierent value of R
A
, B selects one of the values R
A
by
some strategy, e.g. at random or using B's preferred servers (if he/she has any), and rejects all
messages not providing this value; of course, this is unlikely to arise in practice, since it could
only arise by active interference with messagesM
2i
sent to a number of servers.
Of course, if k or more servers have already been rejected prior to this point then there is no
chance of proceeding. As soon as such an event arises B must either restart the protocol and
send messages M
2i
again, or ask A to restart the protocol from message M
1
.
B now computes its provisional value of K
AB
as K = (R
A
)
D
B
, then calculates h(K;A), and
sends M
4
to A.
M
4
: B ! A : fR
A
; R
B
; Bg
K
AS
1
; fR
A
; R
B
; Bg
K
AS
2
; : : : ; fR
A
; R
B
; Bg
K
AS
n
; h(K;A);
if necessary replacing that part of the message corresponding to a rejected server with an error
message.
After receiving message M
4
, A deciphers the n enciphered blocks using K
AS
i
(1  i  n) and
checks them in a similar way to B. A rst rejects any message with an incorrect value of R
A
or an incorrect identier B. As for B, if at any point A nds that k or more servers have been
rejected then A must restart the protocol by sending M
1
again. A now compares the values of
R
B
in the decrypted text of all remaining blocks (i.e. all those not so far rejected). If at least
n   k + 1 of the values agree on a value R
B
, then A provisionally accepts this value of R
B
.
A now computes its provisional value of K
AB
as K
0
= R
B
D
A
, next calculates h(K
0
; A), and then
compares this hash-value with the hash-value received fromB. If it matches,A has conrmation
that the provisionally accepted value of R
B
is correct (and hence K
AB
= K
0
is correct), and
that B has the key K
AB
; A has also authenticated B. A now computes h(K
0
; B) and sends
message M
5
to B.
M
5
: A! B : h(K
0
; B)
On receipt of M
5
, B computes h(K;B) and compares it with the value in M
5
. This conrms
that the provisionally accepted value of R
A
is correct (and hence K
AB
= K is correct), and
that A has obtained K
AB
; B has also authenticated A.
4.2 Security analysis
Theorem 1 If the protocol succeeds, then A and B will have:
 mutually authenticated one another,
 agreed on the same key K
AB
, which will equal h(g
D
A
D
B
), where D
A
and D
B
are the values
chosen by A and B during the protocol, and which will not be known to any server,
 provided mutual key conrmation.
Proof: To establish this result we proceed in a step-wise way. We rst consider the value
of R
A
accepted by B after receipt of messages M
3i
. We wish to establish that this is a value
of R
A
chosen by A at some point in the past (either in this `run' of the mechanism or in some
previous run). First observe that we assumed that the encryption mechanism in use provides
origin authentication and data integrity, and thus successful decipherment of a message implies
that the recipient has guarantees that the content came from an entity which knows the relevant
secret. Thus each server S
i
, after receiving messageM
2i
, will either obtain values of R
A
and R
B
that were `correct' at some point in the past, or will know that the message has been interfered
with.
Now, since we assume that at most n   k servers can collude and B will only provisionally
accept R
A
if the same value if provided by n   k + 1 servers, then we know that a value R
A
provisionally accepted by B (after receipt of M
3i
) must correspond to a value chosen by A at
some time in the past, and we have our desired result.
We briey observe that it is theoretically possible for two or more values of R
A
to be acceptable,
i.e. for n  k+ 1 of the messages to agree on one value, another n  k+ 1 messages to agree on
a dierent value, and so on. This could happen (given k is large enough) if a suciently large
number of messages M
2i
were replaced with corresponding messages from a previous iteration
of the protocol. As stated in the description of the algorithm, B's strategy in such an event is
to accept one of the values, and if the wrong one is accepted then the protocol will fail.
By a similar argument we can show that the value of R
B
provisionally accepted by A must be
a value of R
B
selected by B for use with A at some point in the past.
We now consider what we can conclude if A nds that the hash value in message M
4
matches
the hash-code h(K
0
; A) computed using K
0
(A's value of K
AB
). Since we assumed that h is
collision-free, this implies that K = K
0
. Now, A knows that K
0
= g
D
A
D
B
for some value of
D
B
chosen at some point in the past by B (and known only to B). Hence, since K = K
0
, A
knows that either K must have been computed as K = R
D
B
A
or else some third party, knowing
only R
A
= g
D
A
and R
B
= g
D
B
, has found a way to compute g
D
A
D
B
. But this is impossible by
our assumption regarding the diculty of the Die-Hellman problem. But only B can have
computed K = R
D
B
A
, since only B knows D
B
. Hence R
B
is the current `fresh' value chosen by
B, since B has used it with R
A
, and A has conrmation that K
AB
is the `correct' shared key
and is known by B (key conrmation). A has also authenticated B. Note that it was necessary
for our reasoning that no value of D
B
ever used by B in this protocol has become compromised.
Exactly similar arguments apply to the processing of message M
5
by B (again noting that it
is necessary that no value of D
A
ever chosen by A has become compromised. The result now
follows. 2
Remark 1 As noted above, the protocol we have just described requires all the values D
A
and
D
B
which have ever been used by A and B to remain uncompromised. In practice this is not an
unreasonable assumption. However, for completeness, in the next section we describe a protocol
which remains secure even if such values become compromised (subject to certain assumptions).
Of course, it should be clear that any group of k malicious servers can disrupt the protocol
by sending incorrect values in messages M
3i
. Moreover any entity can prevent the protocol
succeeding by manipulating and/or suppressing some of the exchanged messages. This second
point will, of course, be just as true for any protocol. The rst point is potentially a little more
serious, since we are dealing with `untrustworthy' servers.
However, in practice, authentication servers (e.g. network operators or service providers in
mobile telecommunications networks) will normally be expected to operate correctly. The
purpose of a protocol of the type we have just described is to detect untrustworthy behaviour
in the unlikely event that it occurs, not to correct persistent faulty behaviour. If one or more
servers consistently fails to follow protocol specications correctly, then we would expect them
to be removed from the network (or at least gain a very bad reputation!).
5 A more robust protocol
We now consider a variant of our protocol which again operates in the `minimal trust' case,
where no servers are trusted to behave correctly, and which also remains secure even if previously
used secret values D
A
or D
B
become known to a server.
As in the previous section we suppose that A and B believe that no more than n   k of the n
servers can collude to defraud them (the case k = 1 corresponds to the situation described in
Case 4 above).
5.1 Protocol description
The rst two message exchanges (i.e. M
1
and M
2i
, 1  i  n) are exactly as for the previous
case, as is the associated checking.
On receipt of M
2i
, server S
i
(1  i  n) chooses a random number T
i
and sends message M
3i
(1  i  n) to B.
M
3i
: S
i
! B : fR
A
; R
B
; B; T
i
g
K
AS
i
; fR
B
; R
A
; A; T
i
g
K
BS
i
After receivingM
3i
, 1  i  n, B deciphers the second part of each message using K
BS
i
. B next
checks that the decrypted half of each message M
3i
contains both the correct value of R
B
and
the expected identier for A; if not, B rejects the server S
i
. As in the previous protocol, if no
response is obtained from S
i
before some predened time-out, B will reject this server. B now
obtains the values of R
A
from the decrypted second half of all received accepted messages M
3i
(suppose there are m dierent such values (1  m  n)), and uses these values in conjunction
with D
B
to compute a series of `candidate' values for K
AB
: label these values K
1
; K
2
; : : : ; K
m
.
As previously, if k or more servers have already been rejected prior to this point then there is
no chance of proceeding. As soon as such an event arises B must either restart the protocol
and send messages M
2i
again, or ask A to restart the protocol from messageM
1
.
B now enumerates every (n  k+1)-subset of f1; 2; : : : ; ng (i.e. all
 
n
k 1

of them), and for each
such subset W = fw
1
; w
2
; : : : ; w
n k+1
g, computes the m values:
h(K
1
; T
w
1
; T
w
2
; : : : ; T
w
n k+1
; A);
h(K
2
; T
w
1
; T
w
2
; : : : ; T
w
n k+1
; A); : : : ;
h(K
m
; T
w
1
; T
w
2
; : : : ; T
w
n k+1
; A)
using the values of T
1
; T
2
; : : : ; T
n
recovered from the messages M
3i
. Note that, when concate-
nated together as input to the hash-function, the values T
w
i
are always assembled in an agreed
order (e.g. alphabetical/numerical order of server IDs).
B now sends M
4
to A, containing the rst half of the n messages from the servers S
i
, and all
m
 
n
k 1

computed values:
M
4
: B ! A : fR
A
; R
B
; B; T
1
g
K
AS
1
; fR
A
; R
B
; B; T
2
g
K
AS
2
; : : : ; fR
A
; R
B
; B; T
n
g
K
AS
n
;
h(K
1
; T
w
1
; T
w
2
; : : : ; T
w
n k+1
; A);
h(K
2
; T
w
1
; T
w
2
; : : : ; T
w
n k+1
; A); : : :
h(K
m
; T
w
1
; T
w
2
; : : : ; T
w
n k+1
; A); : : :
where W = fw
1
; w
2
; : : : ; w
n k+1
g ranges over all (n  k + 1)-subsets.
Note that, if necessary, B replaces that block of the rst n blocks of the message corresponding
to a rejected server with an error message.
After receiving message M
4
, A deciphers the rst n blocks using K
AS
i
(1  i  n); A rejects
any block if the identier or the value R
A
are not the expected values. A now collects the
various dierent values of R
B
that the accepted blocks contain (suppose there are m
0
dierent
such values (1  m
0
 n)), and uses these values in conjunction with D
A
to compute a series
of `candidate' values for K
AB
: label these values K
0
1
; K
0
2
; : : : ; K
0
m
0
.
A now enumerates every (n  k+1)-subset of f1; 2; : : : ; ng (i.e. all
 
n
k 1

of them), and for each
such subset W = fw
1
; w
2
; : : : ; w
n k+1
g, computes the m
0
values:
h(K
0
1
; T
w
1
; T
w
2
; : : : ; T
w
n k+1
; A);
h(K
0
2
; T
w
1
; T
w
2
; : : : ; T
w
n k+1
; A); : : : ;
h(K
0
m
0
; T
w
1
; T
w
2
; : : : ; T
w
n k+1
; A)
using the values of T
1
; T
2
; : : : ; T
n
recovered from the rst n blocks of message M
4
.
A now pairwise compares all the newly computed values (all m
0
 
n
k 1

of them) with the m
 
n
k 1

values in the second half of messageM
4
. If any agreement is found, then A immediately adopts
as the shared key K
AB
the value of K
0
i
used to compute its matching value.
A then computes h(K
AB
; T
w
0
1
; T
w
0
2
; : : : ; T
w
0
n k+1
; B) for precisely that (n   k + 1)-subset W
0
=
fw
0
1
; w
0
2
; : : : ; w
n
0
 k+1
g of f1; 2; : : : ; ng for which a match was found during the processing of
message M
4
, and sends messageM
5
to B. Otherwise, A sends B an error message.
M
5
: A! B : h(K
AB
; T
w
0
1
; T
w
0
2
; : : : ; T
w
0
n k+1
; B)
On receipt of M
5
, B again enumerates every (n  k+ 1)-subset of f1; 2; : : : ; ng (i.e. all
 
n
k 1

of
them), and for each such subset W = fw
1
; w
2
; : : : ; w
n k+1
g, computes the m values:
h(K
1
; T
w
1
; T
w
2
; : : : ; T
w
n k+1
; B);
h(K
2
; T
w
1
; T
w
2
; : : : ; T
w
n k+1
; B); : : : ;
h(K
m
; T
w
1
; T
w
2
; : : : ; T
w
n k+1
; B)
using the values of T
1
; T
2
; : : : ; T
n
recovered from the messages M
3i
.
B now pairwise compares all the newly computed values (all m
 
n
k 1

of them) with the hash
value in message M
5
. If any agreement is found, then B immediately adopts that particular
value of K
i
as the shared key K
AB
.
5.2 Security analysis
Theorem 2 If the protocol succeeds, then A and B will have:
 mutually authenticated one another, and
 agreed on the same key K
AB
, which will equal h(g
D
A
D
B
), where D
A
and D
B
are the values
chosen by A and B during the protocol, and which will not be known to any server,
and B will have `key conrmation' (i.e. B will have conrmation that A has the shared key
K
AB
), although A will not have such conrmation until a message is received from B secured
using the shared key.
Proof: First consider how a `match' might occur in the comparisons that A performs after
receipt of message M
4
. Suppose that
h(K
i
; T
w
1
; T
w
2
; : : : ; T
w
n k+1
; A) = h(K
0
j
; T
w
0
1
; T
w
0
2
; : : : ; T
w
0
n k+1
; A);
for some i; j and W = fw
1
; w
2
; : : : ; w
n k+1
g.
Given that h is collision-free (as in our assumptions), it must hold that
K
i
= K
0
j
; and w
s
= w
0
s
(1  s  n  k + 1):
Now, since no more than n  k of the servers can collude (by our trust assumption), it follows
that no single server knows all the values T
w
1
; T
w
2
; : : : ; T
w
n k+1
. Moreover, because A checks
the identier of B in all the server-generated blocks it receives, A also knows that servers
S
w
1
; S
w
2
; : : : ; S
w
n k+1
all claim to have sent the respective values T
w
1
; T
w
2
; : : : ; T
w
n k+1
to B.
Thus, on the assumption that no more than n   k servers collude, i.e. no more than n   k
servers can agree to tell the same lie to A, only B could possibly know all the values necessary
to compute the message, and hence B must have sent the value:
h(K
i
; T
w
1
; T
w
2
; : : : ; T
w
n k+1
; A):
Moreover, the message must be `fresh', since all the values of T
w
i
were sent with the correct
value of R
A
.
Now since A computed K
0
j
, it is clear that K
0
j
= g
D
A
x
for some value x, where g
x
was sent to
A by one of the servers. Similarly, since we know that B computed K
i
, and since we know it is
a fresh message, it is clear that K
i
= g
D
B
y
for some value y, where g
y
was sent to B by one of
the servers, and where D
B
is B's `current' secret.
We know that
g
D
A
x
= g
D
B
y
i.e. either x = D
B
and y = D
A
(which is what we desire to show) or a server (or pair of servers)
have found a value z = xy
 1
, where y
 1
is computed modulo p  1, such that
(g
D
A
)
z
= g
D
B
without knowledge of D
A
or D
B
. But this is impossible by our assumption regarding the
diculty of the Die-Hellman problem. The fact that a previous value of D
B
may have been
compromised does not pose a threat in this case.
Hence A knows that K
0
j
was computed using the correct (fresh) value of D
B
, and thus A has
accepted the `correct key'. Thus we have established that:
 A can only accept the correct key K
AB
, and
 A has authenticated B.
However A does not have conrmation that B knows which is the correct key, since B only has
the correct key amongst a set of candidate keys.
By an exactly analogous argument, we can deduce that B will:
 only accept the correct key K
AB
, and
 authenticate A.
In addition, and unlike the situation for A, B will have conrmation that A knows the correct
key. 2
Remark 2 The denition of servers `not colluding' is implicit in the above proof. We assumed
that n  k + 1 values of T
i
cannot be known by anyone apart from B. Of course, if the servers
deliberately reveal their values of T
i
, then the protocol may fail. However, a server gains little
by revealing secrets (unless they are part of a conspiracy), and hence such a possibility does not
seem to be a serious practical threat.
As for the protocol described in Section 4, any group of k servers can prevent A and B from
establishing a key by sending dierent values of T
i
to A and B. However, again as before, all
they can do is ensure that the protocol fails, and they cannot force A or B to accept anything
other than the `correct' key.
Further if one or both of the keys K
AS
i
and K
BS
i
are compromised for t of the servers S
i
, by
which we mean that the keys are publicly known to all malicious parties (but A and B are not
aware of the compromise), then the protocol will still work correctly as long as no more than
n   k   t servers collude.
6 Other variants of the protocol
6.1 Relaxed trust requirements
Observe that the two variants of the protocol described in Sections 4 and 5 work in Case 4 of the
possible trust relationships dened in Section 2. The processing of the protocol can potentially
be relaxed if A and B can trust the set of servers to a greater extent, e.g. as in Case 2. To see
this we give an example.
Suppose A and B trust dierent but identied servers, e.g. their own service providers in a
mobile telecommunications system. Note that A (and B) only knows which server it trusts,
and does not know which one is trusted by the other party. This is why they might still make
use of n servers (n > 2), not just the two servers trusted by one of them. A and B now only
need to check whether or not a particular message from their own trustworthy server has been
received; if it has, then any other message with a dierent R
B
or R
A
can be rejected and further
processing will continue.
6.2 K
AB
`strengthened' by servers
There may be a need for the session key K
AB
to be `strengthened' by servers. We give an
example of a possible reason for this. In the protocol variants described previously, if any
symmetric key K
AS
i
shared between A and S
i
is known to B, B could obtain R
A
fromM
1
and
then control the resultant session key by selecting D
B
. In order to prevent this, the servers may
be asked to provide a contribution to the session key.
In such a case, exactly the same message exchanges as employed in Section 5 can be used,
except that the nal shared key is
K
0
AB
= g
D
A
D
B
T
w
1
T
w
2
:::T
w
n k+1
where fT
w
1
; T
w
2
; : : : ; T
w
n k+1
g is the set of values used to compute message M
5
.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have analysed the possible trust relationships between clients and servers during
authentication and key distribution, and proposed a protocol using minimally trusted servers.
The protocol is based on symmetric cryptography and Die-Hellman key agreement. On the
assumption that not all servers are untrustworthy and colluding, no untrustworthy server can
subvert the protocol either by impersonating one client to another or compromising the security
of communications between two clients. Even if the symmetric keys shared by clients and servers
are compromised, any malicious third party (e.g. an interceptor) cannot discover the resultant
session key, if it is agreed by two clients.
The protocol does not meet likely legal requirements for warranted interception [7], because
only the two users know the resultant session key if the protocol is successful. In some cases,
governments have requirements to intercept user trac in order to combat crime and protect
national security, see e.g. [1]. So, a possible topic for future research in this area is how to provide
an authentication and key distribution service in which no untrustworthy server can compromise
the users' secrets, as well as meeting the legal requirements for warranted interception in the
domains it serves.
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